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~&. HE success or failure of any course of action
often depends on the ability to anticipate events that
have not yet occurred, or that have occurred but at’e
notyet known. The real return on an investment, for
example, can he pi’edicted hut not actually known at
the time the investment decision is made. Since the
failure to predict accurately the consequences of to-
day’s decisions can have significant costs, it pays for
individuals to attempt to anticipate these conse-
quences. To do this, a ‘‘rational’’ individual uses all of
the iiiformation at his disposal to improve predictive
accuracy. In general, this includes information about
how the economy works and how the government
conducts policy. Such an individual, thus, would have
“rational expectations.”
It is difficult to argue with the notion of rational
expectations as described above, since the alternative
implies that the individual ignores accessible informa-
tion that would increase his foresight. It is, therefore,
not surprising that the assumption of rational expec-
tations has gained wide pi’ominence in economic
theory, to the point that one hears reference to the
rational expectations “revolution.” Rational expecta-
tions models, however, generally contain an addi-
tional element that has little to do with the formation
of expectations: the assumption of equilibrium. In
otherwords, supply is assumed to equal demand in all
markets at all times. This is a depai’ture from tradi-
tional ‘‘Keynesian’’ analysis, in which stl-uctural rigidi-
ties create disequilibrium, and a return to classical
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that is, pre—Keynesian) analysis. Therefore, rational
expectations theory is also sometimes referred to as
the “new classical” economics.
Rational expectations models have altered the way
economists view the role of economic policY. In strict-
est form, these models imply that government poli-
cies, including monetary policy, have no effect on real
output — the pohcv ineffectiveness proposition. This
proposition contrasts sharpI~ with the standard
Keynesian anal sis of the effects of monetary policy,
that is, that increased money growth results in both
greater real output and higher inflation, implying a
trade-ofi’between inflation and unemployment. It also
contrasts with standard monetarist analysis, in which
money is neutral in the long run, hut has expansionary
short-run effects. Not surprisingly, the policy inef-
fectiveness proposition has generated a great deal of
controversy.’
This article has three major purposes: Ill to lay out
the basic theoi’v of rational expectations as it relates to
monetary policy in away that stresses its applicability
to the real world, 121 to discuss some of the ways that
rational expectations models can be altered to give
results that refute the policy ineffectiveness proposi-
tion and, most importantly, 131 to assess the overall
conti-ibution of rational expectations theory to our
understanding of the role of monetary policy. Regard-
ing the latter, this paper stresses that the policy rec-
ommendation that frequently arises ft’om rational ex-
pectations models — a more predictable monetary
For a sample of the variety of opinions among economists about
rational expectations, see Lee (1984).FErJERAr Fi:ESERVE Err,NK OF ST. TOU1S
policy — isessentially the same as that recommended
by monetarists and depends critically on there being




Expectations are rational in the manner’ described
by Muth (1961) as long as the public’s expectation of a
variable to be forecast is based on what it knows about
how that variable is determined! For example, individ-
uals have some knowledge of how production, em-
plcyment and pricing decisions are made, and they
use this knowledge in making forecasts. Rational ex-
pectations models go beyond this fairly simple as-
sumption, however, by stressing that all individuals
make consistently optimal decisions. This is usually
taken to mean that all markets are in equilibrium,
since in disequilibrium, transactions could be made
that benefit both buyer and seller.
An example of amodel that incorporates these clas-
sical features is one in which each business firm maxi-
mizes the present value of expected real profit and
each consumer maximizes the expected utility from
real consumption. In such a model, a firm’s produc-
tion and employment of inputs generally depend on
the current and expected future prices of its output
and inputs relative to the general level of prices. Like-
wise, the demand for afirm’s output is afunction of its
current and expected future relative prices and real
consumer wealth! A key element of the model is that
the supply of output increases as the producer per-
ceives an increase in the price ofhis output relative to
prices in general! As a simple example, consider a
producer who uses only his own labor as an input, so
that the relative price of his otitput equals his real
wage. It pays for the producer to provide greater work
effort in times of a higher real wage than in times of a
‘Other descriptive treatments of rational expectations include Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (1977), Berkman (1980), Mad-
dock and Carter (1982) andSheffrin (1983).
‘More specifically, the forecast of a variable is its mathematical
expectation based on some knowledge of the process that gener-
ates thatvariable.
‘The rate at which future returns are discounted may alsobe impor-
tant in determining both supply and demand.
‘There is a supposition in rational expectations models that any
change in relative prices is viewed as temporary. This is areason-
able assumption since a persistently higher relative price would
attract additional entrants to the industry, thus driving the relative
price backdown.
lower real wage. This increase in labor supply results
in greater output.’
Relative prices are always changing due to a multi-
tude of factors including consumers’ tastes and pref-
erences, the technology used in producing various
products and the availability of productive inputs. An
unanticipated change in one of these factors can be
called a “real” shock. It is possible for real shocks to
affect the aggregate price level as well as relative
prices. At the same time, the aggregate price level
could be changing due to a change in the supply of
money. Anunanticipated change in the money supply
is a “nominal” shock! For simplicity, it is assumed
below that “aggregate’ shocks are synonymous with
nominal shocks, and real shocks are simply ‘relative”
shocks.
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An important feature of most rational expectations
models is the incomplete flow of current information
across markets. Both producers and consumers lack
complete information about current prices in other
markets, so that supply and demand depend on per-
ceptions of current relative prices rather than the ac-
tual (unknown( relative prices.’
The producer- who observes an unexpected in-
crease in his price does not know whether it results
from a relative shock — consumers are unexpectedly
demanding more of his product and less of others —
or an aggregate shock — consumers demand more of
all goods because of greater-than-anticipated money
balances, resulting in a higher aggregate price level.
This is an important distinction since the producer
wishes to adjust output only in response to changes in
relative prices, since he is maximizing i-cal, not nomi-
nal, profit. Thus, if pi-oducers knew that rising prices
were dtie only to an increase in the money supply,
they would not adjust their output; instead, prices
would increase in proportion to the incr’ease in money
supply. Ifthe rational pi-oducer has experienced both
8
lf the producerhasto hirelabor in addition to his own, an increase in
the relative price of output leads to increased demand for labor,
which drives up the real wage. Both the quantity of labor supplied
and the level of production increase. This analysis also can be
applied to inputs otherthan labor,
‘We ignore the possibility that shocks arise from unanticipated
changes in the demand for money.
°A model with this kind of partial information was first used by Phelps
(1970), but also has been used by Lucas(1973), Barro (1976) and
many others.relative and aggregate shocks in the past, then he
cannot be sure that an unanticipated increase in the
market price of his output i-effects one kind of in-
fluence or the other; the producer will tend to assume,
initially, that unanticipated price changes reflect
some combination of both, until more information
becomes available.’
Unanticipated money growth has real effects in the
rational expectations model described above. When
money holdings rise faster than the anticipated price
level, consumers perceive an increase in their real
wealth. The incr-ease their demand for goods and
services, causing an unanticipated increase in the
general price level. Producers believe that their relative
prices have increased and accordingly increase their
output. Thus, the i-cal effects ofunanticipated money
growth arise because per-ceived relative prices deviate
from actual relative prices.”
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Although it was not stated explicitly, this analysis
implies that unanticipated money growth causes out-
put and unemployment to deviate from their “natu-
ral”levels in the short run. These natural levels referto
levels of output and unemployment that are consist-
ent with a long-tet-m rate of growth of output and a
rate of unemployment to which the economy tends to
return aftera disturbance. This notion is referred to as
the “natural rate hypothesis.”
Business cycles can beviewed as persistent hut not
permanent) deviations of actual output and unem-
ployment from their natural levels~.Rational expecta-
tions models have been used to explain the existence
ofbusiness cycles, despite thefact that information on
the aggregate price level becomes known to producers
and consumers at fairly short inten’als. Business cy-
cles can occur if, for- example, unanticipated money
growth results in increased capital investment. This
requires that firms consider currently perceived rela-
tive prices, which are affected by monetary surprises,
to be agood indicator of future real returns on invest-
ment. The effect of a higher rate of investment is
‘The more variable are aggregate shocks compared to relative
shocks, the greater the proportion of a given unanticipated price
increase attributed to aggregate influences. See Lucas (1973).
“Models that include this kind of wealth effect include Hercowitz
(1981) and Cukierman (1982). They show that if the elasticities of
supply and demand differ across markets, then monetary shocks
also affect actual market-clearing relative prices and their variance.
greater productive capacity and greater output over
several periods.”
The behavior- of inventories also plays a potential
i-ole in the persistence of the effect of nominal shocks.
A firm that maintains an inventory can increase its
sales in response to a perceived change in its relative
price by selling out of its inventory. In later periods,
the finn seeks to rebuild its inventory to its desiied
level, which requires additional production and em-
plovment. Iffirms gradually adjust inventories to their
desired levels, then theeffects ofunanticipated money
on output levels may persist for a fairly long period of
time.”
Monetary surprises also can have persistent effects
ifthe public is unable to distinguish perfectly between
permanent and transitory shocks. Applied to money
growth, this means that unanticipated money growth
might represent either a one-time aberration with a
return to the former’ expected money growth path, a
permanent shift to a higher rate of money growth, or
something in between. If rational forecasters have
observed both permanent and transitory shocks in the
past, then they will regard any unanticipated change
in the growth rate of money as being partly permanent
and partly transitory. This means, for example, that
expectations will adjust only gradually to an increase
in the money supply that really is permanent. Fore-
casters, therefore, will underpredict the increase in
money growth until their expectations adjust com-
pletely. Inthis way, nominal shocks can cause persist-
ent changes in output and employment.”
“See Lucas (1975), Because the capital stock is not affected in the
long run by nominal shocks, it must decline from its greater-than-
normal levels at some point in the future. It is worth noting that,
despite the fact that the anticipated real return on investment is
increased by unanticipated money growth, the actual real rate of
interest declines. A monetary surprise implies that the moneystock
rises above anticipated inflation; that is, perceived real money bal-
ancesincrease. This induces individuals to increase theirpurchases
of securities and goods until the real interest rate declines by
enough to induce them to hold the larger amount of money. See
Barro (1981).
“Blinder and Fischer(1981) bringout this pointand analyzethe case
in which desired inventory levels are related negatively to the real
interest rate. The declining real rate induced by unanticipated
money growth (see footnote 11) leads to an increase in production
and employment so that inventories can rise to the new desired
levels, Brunner, Cukierman and Meltzer (1983) take a different
approach to the issue. In their model, goodshave prices and quanti-
ties fixed for one period, but financial markets are free to adjust
continually. The lower real interest rate caused by unanticipated
money growth results in greatercurrent consumption. With thede-
mand for goods higher than their fixed supply, firms sell off part of
their inventories, then replenish them in later periods.
“See Brunner, Cukierman and Meltzer (1980). Notethat this perma-
nent/transitory confusion implies that forecasts can display a per-
sistent bias whenviewed expost, yetbe completely rational ex ante,FE000AL RESFF;VE BANK OF- ST. LOOtS MAT 1985
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‘I’he rational expectations model presented above is
based on three major assumptions: II) theme exist dis-
tinct markets across which information does not flow
smoothly, (2) prices adjust instantaneously so that
each individual market is in equilibrium in even’ pe-
riod, and (3) expectations are formed rationally.
Sargent and Wallace 11975) have shown that, in such a
world, output is not affected by the decision to follow
any systematic monetary policy or “rule’’ — the policy
ineffectiveness proposition. For example, it is irrele-
vant to the determination of output whether the won-
etaiy authority chooses to conttrol interest rates orthe
money supply. The public expects a certain rate of
money growth and adjusts its behavior in advance so
that when the money growth actually occurs, it affects
nominal tnagnitudes the price level and the nominal
rate of interestl hut not i-cal magnitudes. Only money
growth that deviates from the i-ateimplied by the mon-
etary rule affects output. since it is unanticipated.”
This differs from the outcome when expectations
are not formed rationally, that is, when individuals
ignore information that helps to predict ftiture money
gm-owth and inflation. In such a case, poIicymx~akei-s
could exploit a trade-off between unemployment and
inflation, increasing the growth rate of money in order
to expand the economy. Since prices would lag be-
hind changes in money, even policy actions that could
be anticipated would affect real output and unem-
ployment. Thus, to the extent that expectations are
not rational, the particular monetary i-ule adopted has
implications for the real sectoi.
Importance erS’Tfr 4h18 14’uTes
The assumption of price flexibility in this analysis is
critical to the conclusion that anticipated money
growth has no effect on output. In reality, some prices
do not adjust immediately to either aggregate oi rela-
tive shocks. Fixed-price conti-acts and the costs of ad-
justing pnces mitigate against instantaneous price
adjustment.”
“Note that if there were perfect information about all markets, then
moneygrowth could never affect output, for, as Lucas (1975, p. 12)
points out, “,., in an economy in which all trading occurs in a single,
competitivemarket, there is too much’ information in the hands of
tradersfor them ever to be‘fooled’ into alteringreal variables,” This
suggests that efficiency would be increased iftherewere a clearing-
house for contemporaneous price information. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that such an institution could providecomplete information in a
timely manner in a large economy.
“The analysisbelow treats price inflexibility asthough it arises solely
from the existence of explicit price contracts; we recognize that
there alsoare other potential causes,
Pt-ice conti-acts exist, at least partly, as a means of
economizing on seam-cit costs for buyers. Fluctuating
prices make it more difficult for buyers to find the
seller with the lowest price foragiven product. There—
foi-e, firms have an incentive to annotince their prices
in advance, because they will lose some customers
who value this information if they do not,” Given the
hetem-ogeneity ofgoods pm’oduced in the economy, dif-
fering degi-ees of price flexibility anse. For example,
goods that are storable tend to haveless flexible prices
than goods that are not stoi’ahle, because firms can
adjust inventory levels instead ofprices to fluctuations
in demanu. In addition, goods that have customized
featum’es are more likely to have their prices fixed for
sonic penod than goods that are standardized across
sellei.s. Therefore, sonic prices i-espond quickly to
changes in the money stock while others iespond
more slowly.
A5 long as some piices aie set in advance ofthe time
that moneliu’v policy actions are taken, even antici-
pated money gm’owth can have shoi-t-tet-m real effects.
For example, suppose a producer’ has a contract that
specifies a nominal wage for his work for-ce that re-
mains fixed foraperiod oftime. Assuming the contract
cannot he i-enegotiatedl, any information that arrives
after the contract is signed will not affect the nominal
wageuntil the contract expires. The monetarv author-
ity, however, is free to m-eact to the new information in
accordance with its policy rule. If this policy action
causes money growth and the price levell to he higher
than oi-iginally anticipated~ the producer will antici-
pate adecline in the m-ealwage it pays to labor ovei- the
remaining tei-mts of the contiact. When the anticipated
real wage declines, the quantity of labor demanded
mci-eases and so do employment and pm’oduction.”
The existence of Iomig—tei-m contracts, them-efore, im—
“See Alchian (1969).
“Fora more detailed discussion of the differences in price flexibility
across products, see Bordo (1980), Gordon (1981) and Carlton
(1982).
“See Fischer (1977). Foran analysis of price inflexibility that takes a
somewhat different approach, see Phelps and Taylor (1977). The
problem with the analysis presented in the text is that it neglectsthe
short-term laborsupply effectsthat areso important in most rational
expectations models, If both the supply and the demand curve for
labor are relevant in the short run, then deviations of actual from
expected inflation in either direction resultin loweremployment and
output. Furthermore, if a firm’s output price is fixed while its input
prices and the output prices in other markets are flexible, then
unanticipated inflation causes the price of inputs to rise relative to
thefixed output price and the relative price ofthe fixed-pricegood to
decline generally, resulting in reduced supply. It does not seem
likely, however, thata firm that does not chooseto have contracted
wages would chooseto have acontracted price.plies the potential for tl’ie menetamy authority to affect
real output in the short run, even ifit follows a system—
1ttic policv.’l’he structure of contm-acts depends, how-
ever, on the pam-ticular policy rule chosen. For exam—
ple~ifthe policy m-ule allows the inflation rate to vary a
great deal asaresult ofvarious shocks,then the expec-
tations upon which contracts are based are mom-c
likely to he confounded titan ifthe inflation i-ate is kept
fait-ly stable. Therefoi-e, under the fom-mer policy i-ule,
contracts ar-c more likely to include cost-of—livingad-
justment clauses and pmtvisions for reopening con-
tract negotiations and to have shorter dum-ation than
under the latter policy mule. This suggests that a
change in policy from a i-ule iii which inflation re-
mains stable to one in which it is allowed to vary
would not be effective irs the long run, because the
structure of contracts would change. These changes
woutmi cause pm-ices to he more flexible, which would
reduce oreliminate the eftOctsofanticipated policy on
the level of outout
If the public expects the growth mate of money to
incm-ease, it will also expect highet- inflation in the fu-
ture. (liven certain institutional characteristics of the
economy, them-c are a numher of ways in which ex-
pected inflation can affect the accumulation of capital,
even with rational expectations. ‘l’hus. anticipaterl
money will havei-cal effects, and the pollcv ineffective-
ness pm’oposition will not hold. l”om- example, higher
expected inflation causes people to shift pam-t of their
money balances into i-cal capital, because money pmo—
v~desavery low om’ negative m-eal m-etum-n dur-ing times of
inflation,:~5On the other hand, higher expected in-
flation drives up the m-eplacement cost of capitalSwhile
cui-i-ent tax law provides fom’ depi-miciation allowances
for businesses based on the historical cost of capital.
Thus, the expected meal retum-n on capital investment is
lowered, m-esulting irs less capital accumulation!’
If the monetam’y authority vvere to continually ex-
ploit the existence of eithem aver low meal return on
money holdings or clistom-tions ar-ising from the tax
“Friedman (1977) discusses the response of contracts to variable
inflation.
“See Tobin (1965). Fischer (1979) incorporates the Tobin effect in a
rational expectations model.
“See Feidstein and Summers (1978). Atax on nominal interest also
implies that expected inflation affects capital accumulation, if bor-
rowers and lenders ofinvestmentfunds have different taxrates. For
adiscussion ofthe impactofexpected inflation on real interestrates.
see Holland (1984).
treatment of capital depreciation, however, it is likely
that these institutional characteristics would he elimi-
nated. This is not as sti-aightfomward as the adjustment
of pnvate contracts discussed above, since it implies
legislative i-ather than private action. But as inflation
persists, there will be a growing demand for savings
instruments that combine the transaction features of
money with a market rate of return, and investors will
seek to eliminate the effects of inflation on the real
value of depreciation allowances.” tfthe political sys-
tent allows these adjustments to occur’, then the pol-
icy ineffectiyeness proposition would still hold in the
long run.
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The foregoing analysis implies that, if a policy rule
were to he enfom-ced perfectly by the monetary author-
ity, then in the long m-un evemyone would have corn-
ple’r knowledge of the monetary rule, and contracts
and institutions would adjust to it. Thus, the behavior
ofthe money supply would not affect i-cal output, and
any cyclical behavior would arise purely fm’om non-
monetary sources.” Oms the other hand, the monetary
authority can affect the behavior ofoutput ins the short
ten-rn by departing from the rule or by altem’ing the rule
to take advantage of institutional arrangements that
likelywould not continue to exist if they were contin-
ually exploited.”
An impor-tant contribution of the rational expecta-
tions moyement, therefore, is that it shows that the
state of expectations and the institutional structure
adjust to the way policy is conducted, them-ebyaltering
“Casual evidence suggests that these kinds of institutional adjust-
ments are indeed occurring, as transaction balances now may pay
interest, and therecent Treasury Departmentproposal to reform the
tax system includes a provision to alter the way inflation affects the
depreciated value of capital. The recent change to an indexed per-
sonal income tax can also be viewed in this light if the taxation of
nominal interest has affected capital accumulation (see footnote
21).
“By aperfectly enforced monetary rule, I mean one in whichthere is
no deviationof the quantity of money from what was intended due,
for example,to changes in the demand formoney. Shocks to money
demand could have transitory effects on real output and em-
ployment.
“Taylor (1975) presentsa different analysisofthe behavior ofoutput
following a change in the monetary rule. In his model, there is a
transition period during which forecasts display a persistent bias
due to lack of knowledge about the nature ofthe change in policy.
This is very similar to the notion of confusion between permanent
and transitory shocks discussed above. The policy ineffectiveness
proposition does not hold during this transition period, since the
change in the monetaryrule has real effects,FFL’tFPfs,tr’ff’SErsVi’ iffsNKOFS’i, LOUiS MAY 1955
the r-esults of the policy. Thus, the effects of a given
policy will not necessarily be the same every time it is
used. This implies that econometric models that do
not incorporate rational expectations are unlikely to
predict accurately the results of a change in policy.
This is the basis of the “Lucas critique”
Since it is often possible to attain important short-
term benefits with policy measures that confound ex-
pectations, one might expect proponents of rational
expectations to recommend secrecy in the conduct of
monetary policy. This is not the case, however. In-
stead, theyrecommend that monetary policy be made
as predictable as possible by sticking closely to pre-
announced rules” Implicit in this policy recommen-
dation is the assumption that monetary variability —
taken here to be synonymous with uncertainty — im-
poses long-term costs in excess of its short-term
benefits.
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In general, greater monetary variability reduces the
efficiency of the price system by making it more dif-
ficult to distinguish relative price increases from gen-
eral inflation. In the standard rational expectations
model, it is difficult to distinguish between relative
and aggregate shocks, and the variability of each kind
of shock plays an important role. If aggregate shocks,
taken to he monetary surprises, become more variable
compared to relative shocks, then a firm is more likely
to perceive any change in its price as the result of
aggregate rather than relative forces- It, therefore, will
respond less — in terms of changing its levels of out-
put, employment and investment — to an actual
change in relative prices, even when the change is due
to relative shocks. This means that the price system
is less effective as a mechanism for allocating
resources.”
“See Lucas (1976).
“See, for example, Lucas and Sargent (1979).
“Cukierman (1982) shows thatthe difference between the perceived
and actual relative price of a productgrows larger, ceteris paribus,
as monetary variabilitygetslarger, implying a reducedefficiency of
the price system. Cukierman and others also have shown that,
under certain conditions, greater monetaryvariability is associated
with greatervariability ofrelative prices. Furthermore, greatermone-
tary variability also has thepotential to affect real interest rates. The
instability created by highly variable money growth makes for in-
creased uncertainty about future returns on capital and interest-
earning assets and raises the demand for moneyrelative to these
assets, This causes higher real interest rates. In other words, risk-
averse lenders require that a greater “risk premium” be added to
interest rates to offset the greater uncertainty associated with the
future real return(seeMascaroand Meltzer (1983)). The effect is not
unambiguously positive, however, since risk-averse borrowersre-
duce theirdemand forloanable fundsas risk increases, which would
tend to reducethe real rate.
Reduced efficiency in allocating resources lowers
the natural level of output and potentially raises the
natural rateofunemployment. The economy has ways
of adapting, however, to the greater uncertainty
caused by more variahle money growth, including the
greater use ofindexing and the shortened duration of
contracts. These adjustments reduce the risk associ-
ated with monetary variability, implying that the real
effects of mbnetary variability should diminish as high
levels of variability persist through time. The adjust-
ments impose theirown costs, however, since a larger
amount of resources is diverted to the contracting
process from other, presumably more efficient, uses.”
Thus, the economy still is likely to operate more ef-
ficiently in an environment of policy certainty than
policy uncertainty. The analysis, therefore, implies
that efficiency is enhanced by the use of well-defined
and well-publicized policy rules.”
““ r ~-.
The incorporation of rational expectations into
macroeconomic analysis leads one to the conclusion
that the effects of monetary policy actions on real
output and employment depend criticallyon the state
of expectations and the existing institutional struc-
ture. If the public has sufficient knowledge about how
policy is conducted and if institutions have adjusted
to the conduct of policy, then the growth ofthe money
supply will have no effect on real output or employ-
ment at all.
The monetary authority canalways affect output in
the shortrun by actingin a way that confounds expec-
tations. Proponents ofrational expectations, however,
generally recommend that the policy authority not
attempt to fool thepublic as a way ofachieving short-
term goals, since there are potentially serious long-
tenn costs associated with unpredictable policy. The
most important of these are reductions in the ‘natu-
ral” levels of output and employment and a higher
“natural” unemployment rate.
“Gray (1978) presents amodel in which greatermonetary variability
leads to both greateruse of indexing and reduced duration of con-
tracts, She also shows that greater use of wage indexing has an-
other potential cost: bypreventingchanges in real wages, it reduces
the ability of the economy to respond to real shocks.
“In this analysis, the term monetary variability refersto the variability
of unanticipated money growth. Note, however, that if there are
long-term contracts, even the variability of anticipated money
growth can have permanent real effects due to changes in the
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